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Abstract
Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory suggests that falling trade costs should
discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal. Yet, the world witnessed an FDI boom in
1990s, a period of striking falls in trade barriers. This paper carries out an empirical analysis
with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish multinationals around the globe in manu-
facturing sectors from 1987 to 1998 to shed light on this apparent conict. The analysis is based
on the predictions of a recent literature with an industrial organization (IO) angle: Trade costs
have asymmetric e¤ects on foreign expansion modes. This view posits that falling trade costs
encourage entry realized as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), one of the potential explanations
for the conict between received theory and recent trends in FDI. Empirical results conrm the
ndings of this recent literature and add to it by testing its extensions.
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1 Introduction
Standard foreign direct investment (FDI) theory gets its momentum from the so-called proximity-
concentration trade-o¤. Firms invest overseas when benets of doing so outweigh the loss of scale
economies from serving foreign markets from the home country. A natural conclusion is that falling
trade costs should discourage horizontal FDI. Most FDI is horizontal not vertical. Yet, the world
witnessed an FDI boom in 1990s, a period of striking falls in trade barriers; hence the paradox.
Neary (2009) provides an excellent discussion of this conict and o¤ers two possible resolutions:
First, intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI in trading blocs since foreign rms
can use one of the member countries as an export-platform to serve the entire region. Second,
the now-dominant way of conducting FDI, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increase
rather than decrease with falling trade costs. The latter, which I will call the industrial organization
(IO) view from now on, is the central thrust of the current paper.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake foreign direct investment in di¤erent formats:
Cross-border M&As, greeneld FDI, joint ventures, partial acquisitions, and di¤erent forms of
low-equity commitment such as sales o¢ ces, licensing, research centers, etc. In this paper, a
multinational may enter a host market by acquiring/merging with an already existing local rm
(cross-border M&As) or by establishing a new venture (greeneld FDI). Alternative is to serve the
foreign market with exporting, which could potentially capture the low-equity modes of foreign
expansion.1
In standard FDI theory, greeneld FDI is implicitly assumed as the only way to expand pro-
duction in another country. However, recent data show that cross-border M&As have a more than
negligible role in foreign market access by multinational rms. For example, the share of total
M&As in world FDI ows has increased from 52% in 1987 to 83% in 2000 and then declined for
a brief period at the beginning of the new millennium.2 In 2006, FDI ows reached $880 billion
reecting renewed strength in M&A activity, albeit still below the record value in 2000. For devel-
oped countries, where acquisition targets are abundant, the share of cross-border M&As has risen
to nearly 100% in 2000 from 62% in 1987. Yet, cross-border M&As as a mode of foreign entry have
received relatively little attention in the FDI literature until recently.
In this paper, I investigate empirically the role of trade costs in the entry mode choice of MNEs.
1Due to lack of data, the gray area between wholly owned operations and exports could not be included in the
analysis in this paper.
2See World Investment Report (2007).
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This is important because di¤erent entry modes have di¤ering degrees of impact on the inter/intra-
rm resource transfers. These transfers cause industrial restructuring which in turn alters the
income distribution in the host country through its e¤ect on factor prices.3 As a result, aggregate
welfare may shift at the country level. Considering the massive trade liberalization waves of recent
decades and the dominance of sales of foreign a¢ liates ($25,177 billion in 2006) over global exports
($14,120 billion in 2006), it becomes absolutely necessary to rethink the e¤ects of freer trade not
only on trade ows, but also on the FDI ows channeled through di¤erent modes of entry with
mode-specic consequences for the countries hosting considerable amounts of FDI.4
This paper contributes to the existing literature by carrying out an empirical analysis with rich,
rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNEs around the globe in manufacturing sectors from
1987 to 1998. The analysis is based on the predictions of the IO view about the role of trade costs
on foreign expansion. This view posits that falling trade costs encourage entry realized as M&As,
one of the potential explanations for the conict between received theory and recent trends in FDI.
First, I o¤er a simple theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Two hypotheses
are generated: (i) Falling trade costs discourage greeneld FDI and encourage cross-border M&As
and exporting, and (ii) Higher bargaining power measured by international experience dampens
the e¤ect of trade costs on modes of entry. Trade liberalization increases the FDI undertaken not
only by large, productive and diversied rms but also small, less productive and naive ones, too.
These results lend themselves to empirical testing.
Main innovations present in the empirical part are as follows: First, I include all three foreign
access strategies (cross-border M&As, greeneld FDI and exporting) in the analysis, which di¤ers
from many studies that only include two of the strategies at a time. Second, I employ a di¤erent
denition of horizontal investments. In particular, I use the composition of a¢ liate sales to single
out horizontal investments rather than industry classications. Third, I apply the multivariate
probit model to account for the correlation between di¤erent entry strategies, which reduces the
inconsistency of the estimators signicantly.
Results of the empirical analysis show that falling trade costs increase the likelihood of cross-
border M&As as conjectured by recent studies. Entry mode decision of an MNE is a complex
one and there are many asymmetries involved when it comes to the impact of trade costs on
3Neary (2007), Bertrand and Zitouna (2006), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) are recent theory papers focusing
on di¤erent aspects of industry restructuring after M&As. See Andrade and Sta¤ord (2004) and Breinlich (2008) for
latest related empirical work.
4See World Investment Report (2007) for the a¢ liate sales and global exports information.
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this decision. First, cross-border M&As and exporting are complements not substitutes in their
response to trade costs. Second, M&As are even more severely a¤ected by changes in trade costs
than exports. Third, rms with bigger size or many foreign a¢ liates are more immune to changes
in trade costs, whereas small, single a¢ liate rms are severely a¤ected. These results conrm the
ndings of the recent literature with an IO angle on the e¤ects of trade costs on FDI and add to it
by testing a number of extensions of this view.
The paper continues as follows: In the next section, I present the background material in a
manner closely related to Neary (2009). In Section 3, I lay out a very simple model and present the
testable hypotheses generated from it. In section 4, I discuss the econometric analysis. Sections 5
reports the results and I conclude in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Horizontal FDI
The theory of horizontal FDI originates from the idea of proximity-concentration trade-o¤. It is
now standard in the FDI literature and needs no extended discussion here.5 The idea is elegant and
simple indeed. Firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or by producing in that market.
When trade costs get higher, exporting becomes more expensive. To avoid paying high tari¤s, rms
choose investing abroad; hence the term tari¤-jumping. Across time, sectors and space falling trade
costs encourage exports over FDI.
There is indeed considerable but not overwhelming econometric evidence for the proximity-
concentration trade-o¤. Brainard (1997) provides support for the tari¤-jumping motive by using
industry level data for U.S. multinationals. She nds that the share of FDI increases relative
to exports the higher the trade barriers; however, she reports the e¤ect being much weaker in
explaining the level of a¢ liate sales and the probability of observing any a¢ liate sales.
Brainards results in regards to the e¤ects of trade costs on FDI are very similar to the con-
clusions of the well-known knowledge capital model (Markusen, 2002). Predictions of this model
over the structure of FDI are highly nonlinear in the relevant country and industry characteristics.
Horizontal multinationals are found to be dominant if countries are similar in size and relative
endowments and if transport costs are high.
5See Markusen (2002, Chapter 2) or Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 3) for detailed discussions of
the model.
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2.2 Vertical FDI
The theory of vertical FDI originated by Helpman (1984) postulates that incentives for vertical
fragmentation arise from international di¤erences in factor endowments when stages of production
di¤er in their factor intensities. The simplest version of the model assumes two production stages:
headquarter services located in the parent country and production located in the most protable
location. Ignoring the demand in the host country, the rm can remain domestic and serve its home
market from its parent plant.6 It incurs high factor costs but no trade costs. Alternatively, the rm
can engage in FDI and export all its output back home. In that case, it incurs lower factor costs
accompanied by trade costs. In short, the model presents a tension between factor price di¤erences
and trade costs. Lower trade costs encourage FDI in contrast to the horizontal FDI model.
Turning to empirical evidence, the applications of the knowledge capital model rejects the
vertical model in favor of horizontal one. Examples of studies within this line of literature are
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2001b) and Blonigen, Davies and
Head (2003). Firm-level studies such as Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and Yeaple (2003b) present
mixed evidence for vertical FDI.
2.3 Export-platform FDI
The idea behind the export-platform FDI is more complex than both the horizontal and vertical
FDI models. Motta and Norman (1996), Neary (2002), Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and
Markusen (2007) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) are just a few studies addressing the
export-platform FDI. This type of FDI is usually taken to refer to a situation where the output of
a foreign a¢ liate is largely exported to a third country rather than sold in the host country.
Di¤erent from mainstream FDI models, export-platform FDI models include at least three
countries with complex integration strategies. Two countries form a trading bloc lowering the
intra-bloc trade costs. External trade barriers remain more or less the same as before. One generic
result of these models is that intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI in trading
blocs since foreign rms can use one of the member countries as an export-platform to serve the
entire region.
Head and Mayer (2004) analyze the determinants of location choices by Japanese rms in Eu-
rope. They nd that Japanese FDI in Europe is encouraged by market potential which can be
6 If the host country market is not negligible, then there are both horizontal and vertical motives. This makes the
negative impact of trade costs on FDI weaker.
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interpreted evidence for export-platform FDI or agglomeration e¤ects. Blonigen, Davies, Waddell
and Naughton (2007) report clearer evidence for export-platform FDI by using spatial economet-
ric techniques to measure the distance e¤ects beyond adjacent countries. Among their ndings
is that bigger market size in neighboring countries increases U.S. FDI. Chen (2009) and Tekin-
Koru and Waldkirch (2010) provide additional empirical evidence that regional integration raises
FDI in general and export-platform FDI in particular in European Union and NAFTA countries,
respectively.
2.4 Cross-border M&As
In the literature I have discussed so far greeneld FDI is implicitly assumed to be the only way to
expand production in another country. However, recent data show that an overwhelming majority
of overseas investments are in the form of cross-border M&As. In recognition of this trend, a number
of studies drawing on the principles of industrial organization literature have appeared. This new
strand builds market power considerations and e¢ ciency gains through technological progress and
scale economies into an FDI model by explicitly considering cross-border M&As. Görg (2000)
[greeneld vs. M&As], Horn and Persson (2001) [export vs. M&As], Bjorvatn (2004) [export vs.
greeneld vs. M&As], Norbäck and Persson (2004) [export vs. greeneld vs. M&As] and Tekin-
Koru (2009) [export vs. greeneld vs. M&As] provide theoretical models to this e¤ect. These
studies come to a conclusion that high trade costs do not inevitably induce more FDI. In fact, if
anything, trade barriers make cross-border M&As less likely in these models.
Horn and Persson (2001) show that in an international merger formation game without greeneld
FDI domestic rms have an incentive to merge in the presence of su¢ ciently high trade barriers
in order to prevent international mergers. Norbäck and Persson (2004) conrm that low greeneld
costs and low trade costs induce cross-border acquisitions in a mixed international oligopoly, where
state assets are sold at auction. Similar to these studies, Tekin-Koru (2009) shows that in the case
of cross-border M&As higher tari¤s may act as an entry barrier by raising the reservation price of
the acquisition target which is endogenized through Nash bargaining.
A natural extension here is the favorable impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity around
the globe. This idea is formalized in Bjorvatn (2004) and Neary (2007). The former is similar to
Horn and Persson in spirit yet the modeling approach and the mechanisms di¤er. Nearys model,
on the other hand, is unique in the sense that it has a unifying approach between the traditional
FDI and IO views. His conclusion is as follows: Without cost synergies the pattern of cross-border
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M&As which results from economic integration follows that of comparative advantage in the sense
that more e¢ cient rms acquire less e¢ cient foreign rivals. He predicts that cross-border M&As
and exports are complements rather than substitutes.
Turning to recent empirical work, Blonigen (2002) investigates the possibility of tari¤-jumping
by using rm level data on antidumping duties. He nds quite modest tari¤-jumping responses
suggesting that tari¤-jumping is only a realistic option for multinational rms from industrialized
countries. Hizjen, Görg and Manchin (2008) provide empirical evidence by using number of M&As
in 19 manufacturing industries in 23 OECD countries for the period 19902001. They distinguish
horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and nd that the impact of trade costs is less negative for
horizontal mergers, which they interpret as being consistent with the tari¤-jumping argument.
Breinlich (2008) shows that trade liberalization through the CanadaUnited States Free Trade
Agreement increased domestic Canadian M&A activity signicantly whereas there is no robust link
between tari¤ reductions and either domestic U.S. or cross-border M&As.
Briey, there are many ways of explaining the paradox of simultaneous existence of trade liber-
alization and increased FDI. This paper attempts to shed light on this seemingly apparent paradox
by providing empirical evidence on the predictions of the IO view.
3 Trade costs and the form of FDIA theoretical framework
In this section I will show that trade barriers can have asymmetric e¤ects on FDI depending on the
mode of entry into a foreign market. First, cross-border M&As can be encouraged not discouraged
by falling trade costs. Second, this e¤ect can be di¤erent for di¤erent types of multinational rms.
To highlight these e¤ects, in what follows I introduce a toy model of mode of foreign entry in
two stages based on Tekin-Koru (2009) that develops a model on technology transfers in case of
di¤erent foreign entry modes. The model adopted in this paper employs the most basic setting in
Tekin-Koru (2009) where there are no technology transfers in case of M&As to highlight the impact
of trade costs on entry decision.
In the rst stage, entry mode decision is made and product market interaction takes place in
the second stage. I will try to trim the model down to its bare essentials, focus on the assumptions,
and present results in their simplest forms.
Setting. Consider a potential multinational rmm from the parent country seeking to determine
the optimal mode of serving industry j in host country k with n identical local rms where n  2:
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Three foreign market penetration strategies (s) are considered. The multinational can conduct a
greeneld FDI (G), acquire one of the local rms (A) or simply export (E) to the host.
Marginal cost of production for a representative local rm ` is cs` = c; where c 2 (0; 1) for
8s 2 fA;G;Eg: Following Blonigen (1997) and Nocke and Yeaple (2007) I assume that rm m
is endowed with rm-specic assets (such as human capital of employees, patents, blueprints and
procedures) which provide an ownership advantage over other potential rms and cost savings of
 2 (0; c). It is assumed that rm m utilizes its technology to the full extent in a wholly owned
subsidiary and produces at a marginal cost of cGm = c   since the greeneld FDI o¤ers the most
successful internalization of the technology in the rm as discussed in Caves (2007). In case of
an M&A, the marginal cost is cAm = c    where  2 [0; c=) as in Tekin-Koru (2009). Here, I
assume that  = 0, in other words, either the transferred technology is completely useless or no
technology is transferred to the acquired entity. It is helpful to examine this simple case to highlight
the impact of trade costs on the entry decision which is the main focus of the present paper.7 In
essence, the marginal cost of the acquired entity is the same as the local competitors, cAm = c.
8 In
case of exporting there are added trade costs  2 (0; c), so cEm = c   +  :
The xed costs of production change with the mode of entry also. Zero xed costs are assumed
for the case of exporting. In the case of greeneld FDI, there is a given xed cost of entry FG; and
in the case of M&As the initial sum to be incurred or the acquisition price FA; is endogenously
determined by a simple bargaining process.
We can now state rm ms prots from alternative ways of serving the market:
Am = 
A
m(c ;n  1  )  F
A
Gm = 
G
m(c ; +;n )  F
G (1)
Em = 
E
m(c ; ;+
 ;n )
The signs under arguments indicate that operating prots , are decreasing in own production and
trade costs and the number of rms, and increasing in the production cost savings provided by the
7 In case of positive technology transfers, results related to trade costs still hold but the proofs become more
complicated. See Tekin-Koru (2009) for more detail.
8There are two, non-exclusive arguments to defend a zero technology transfer in the case of an M&A. "First,
with acquisitions, the multinational acquires existing assets and inherits a labor force. Both the machinery and
personnel (workers and management) may not be suitable for the exploitation of the multinationals assets. Second,
the multinational may decide not to deploy its rm specic assets in the host country for the fear that they may
di¤use to competitors, e.g. via personnel movements (as in Siotis 1999). Either one or both of these motives provide
a justication for the multinationals choice to use the existing technology in the host market." (Tekin-Koru, 2009,
p.560)
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ownership of rm-specic assets.
The foundation of the proximity-concentration trade-o¤ and what it implies are immediately
clear. Higher xed costs favor exporting over greeneld FDI, whereas higher trade costs favor
greeneld FDI over exporting. It is a simple yet powerful result. It is also a result oblivious to the
possibility of a cross-border M&A whose initial cost can be di¤erent for di¤erent levels of trade
costs. Thus, it is worth teasing out the riches that come with an M&A.
Bargaining. In the rst stage of the game, rms m and ` seek to split a total surplus if
and only if they agree on a specic division.9 If there is no agreement, then each party would
take up its outside opportunity. When exporting is the best alternative to an M&A form rm
m (max

Em;
G
m
	
= Em), the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from that is greater
than the payo¤ from exporting. Similarly, when greeneld FDI is the best alternative to an M&A
(max

Em;
G
m
	
= Gm), the multinational prefers an M&A if the payo¤ from that is greater than
the payo¤ from greeneld FDI.
Let FA be proportional to the payo¤ from the outside opportunity, namely the reservation
price of the selling party RA` and inversely proportional to the bargaining strength  2 (0; 1) of the
buying party:
FA =
RA`

(2)
where
RA` =
8><>:
E` (c ;  ; +;n ) if max

Em;
G
m
	
= Em
G` (c ;  ;n ) if max

Em;
G
m
	
= Gm
(3)
Comparative statics. Let me now discuss how trade costs may a¤ect the multinationals foreign
investment decision. It is obvious from expression (1) that greeneld FDI payo¤Gm is not a¤ected
by a change in trade costs  , whereas exporting payo¤ Em declines in  . Thus, falling trade costs
encourage exporting. The e¤ect of trade costs on cross-border M&As is not immediately clear,
however. The following hypotheses can be obtained from this simple model to illustrate how trade
costs may have an asymmetric e¤ect on a multinationals entry mode decision:
Hypothesis 1 Falling trade costs discourage greeneld FDI and encourage cross-border M&As and
exporting.
9Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) state that a merger between two rms is not protable in an industry with
more than two identical rms. Neary (2007) shows that unless costs are very similar bilateral mergers are indeed
protable. Tekin-Koru (2009) notices that for rm ` the relevant options are M&As with n  1 rms, or exports or
greeneld FDI with n rms. There is no surplus in the Salant et al. (1983) sense, however, the alternative to an M&A
is to have an additional rm active in the market. Therefore, here I will assume that bilateral M&As are protable.
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The cross-border M&A payo¤ is not a¤ected if the next best alternative to a negotiated agree-
ment is greeneld FDI. However, if exporting is the next best alternative, then di¤erentiating Am
with respect to trade costs  gives
dAm
d
=  dF
A
d
=  d
E
`
d| {z }
+
 1
|{z}
+
< 0 (4)
Notice that the acquisition price FA is proportional to the reservation price of the local rm RA` .
When exporting is the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement, falling trade costs reduce
the protability of the local incumbent in a likely exporting scenario E` . Hence, the reservation
price of the local rm declines. This makes a cross-border M&A a less expensive choice for the
multinational. Therefore, falling trade costs encourage FDI if it is in the form of an M&A. This
result is in line with Horn and Persson (2001), Norbäck and Persson (2004), Bjorvatn (2004) and
Neary (2007). While exporting and greeneld FDI remain to be substitutes, exporting and cross-
border M&As are complements.
Furthermore, if
dE`d   dEmd , then falling trade costs encourage M&As even more so than
exports. This last enunciation holds as long as the local incumbent is more sensitive to trade costs
than the multinational. Indeed this may be the case if the two rms are similarly productive (low
) and trade costs are not negligible (high ). A major implication of this result is that broader
globalization should promote FDI rather than relegate it.
Hypothesis 2 Falling trade costs induce relatively more M&As by multinationals with less bar-
gaining power.
Due to a decline in the reservation price of the acquisition target, falling trade costs make M&As
cheaper for all rms compared to the high trade cost regime. Nevertheless, it is relatively more
so for rms with much less bargaining power. To see this, let us di¤erentiate expression (4) with
respect to :
d2Am
dd
=  d
2FA
dd
=
@E`
@| {z }
+
 1
2|{z}
+
> 0 (5)
Imagine a multinational with very low . This will make the acquisition price FA much higher
for this particular rm. Falling trade costs will reduce the reservation price of the acquisition
target. Since the nal acquisition price is inversely proportional to the bargaining strength of the
multinational, relative decline in the acquisition price will be much more pronounced for this type
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Figure 1: Bargaining Strength, Trade costs and M&As
of rm. All this can be illustrated in (FA; ) space as in Figure 1. It is the isogram of FA and 
for di¤erent values of trade costs  : Notice that FA is decreasing in  and lower contours represent
falling trade costs. Also notice that when trade costs decline from 2 to 1; for lower bargaining
strengths  = 1 the decline in FA is much higher compared to the decline for higher bargaining
strengths  = 2:
Implications of this hypothesis is clear: Trade liberalization increases the FDI undertaken not
only by large, productive and diversied rms that are supposedly strong bargainers but also small,
less productive and naive ones, too. The results of this section lend themselves to empirical testing
and I now turn to a discussion of the empirical analysis and the dataset.
4 Econometric analysis
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that trade costs can have
asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent ways of serving a foreign market. The following econometric analysis
provides the impact of trade costs on foreign entry modes by using a sample of Swedish multinational
rms.
4.1 Econometric model
Hypothesis 1 in the previous section states that trade costs have asymmetric e¤ects on a multina-
tionals mode of foreign expansion. While greeneld FDI declines with falling trade costs, cross-
10
border M&As and exporting are encouraged. Put it di¤erently, exporting and cross-border M&As
are complements rather than substitutes. I use the following specication to test these predictions:
yijkt;s = 0;s + 1;s jkt + 
0
2;sxit + 
0
3;sxkt + "ijkt;s (6)
where yijkt;s is a binary indicator if rm is entry into industry j in country k during time period t
in the form of s 2 fA;G;Eg,  jkt denotes trade costs, xit is a vector of rm-specic variables, and
xkt is a vector of country-specic variables. I also include time, industry and country xed e¤ects
in all specications to account for the e¤ect of unobservables.10
Hypothesis 2 involves asymmetry. In the face of rapid trade liberalization, multinationals
without much bargaining power conduct relatively more M&As. To test this prediction I include
an interaction term of trade costs and bargaining power in expression (6):
yijkt;s = 0;s + 1;s jkt + 2;s jktit + 
0
3;sxit + 
0
4;sxkt + "ijkt;s (7)
The nested logit model is the most appropriate econometric method to use since the MNE rst
gures out the next best alternative to a negotiated agreement and then enters. However, the
data does not involve any choice specic attributes (variables specic to each entry mode, such
as the cost of M&As or greeneld xed costs), which makes implementing the nested logit model
impossible. Therefore, the paper adheres to the most general setting where the rm decides if and
how to enter.11
Accounting for correlation can be very important in qualitative response models such as the
one in the current study, since controlling for it can reduce the inconsistency of the estimators
signicantly. Hence, the next best econometric model is a multivariate probit because it allows a
exible pattern of conditional covariance among the latent utilities of alternatives.
Applications of multivariate probit models in higher dimensions have been limited until recently
due to the fact that required integrations of the multivariate normal density over subsets of Euclidian
space are computationally burdensome. However, the development of the highly accurate Geweke-
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) probability simulator opened a gate for the applications. In this paper,
10 In a study like the current one, more industry-specic variables would be preferred, in particular a measure of
concentration in industry j in country k during time period t. OECD STAN database o¤ers concentration measures
for a limited number of OECD countries. I used these in my early regressions without much success due to too many
missing observations and small sample sizes.
11At rst a multinomial logit model is employed. Yet, the independence of irrelevant alternatives test has failed.
Results are available upon request.
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the simulated maximum likelihood method using a GHK simulator is adopted, since it is found to
be superior to the other simulation based models in Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994).
In this paper, I use both the bivariate probit and the multivariate probit models. I begin with
the bivariate probit model, because it provides the benet of being able to calculate the marginal
e¤ects for each entry strategy.12 First, I estimate tari¤e¤ects on FDI (M&A and greeneld together)
versus exporting, because it would provide a useful comparison to some of the existing literature
that does not take di¤erent entry modes into account. When the bivariate probit is used for the
choice between FDI and exporting, there are two equations (one for FDI and one for exporting)
and two binary dependent variables, yijkt;FDI (1 if there is FDI and 0 otherwise) and yijkt;E (1 if
there is exporting and 0 otherwise). If the MNE chooses FDI, then yijkt;FDI = 1 and yijkt;E = 0.
If the MNE chooses exporting, then yijkt;FDI = 0 and yijkt;E = 1.
Then, I turn to bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on new entry by Swedish multinationals
through cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI. Again, there are two equations (one for M&As and
one for greeneld investments) and two binary dependent variables, yijkt;A (1 if there is an M&A
and 0 otherwise) and yijkt;G.(1 if there is a greeneld investment and 0 otherwise). If the MNE
chooses A, then yijkt;A = 1 and yijkt;G = 0. If the MNE chooses G, then yijkt;A = 0 and yijkt;G = 1.
Lastly, when the multivariate probit is used there are three equations (one for A, one for G
and one for E) and three binary variables, yijkt;A, (1 if there is A and 0 otherwise) yijkt;G (1 if
there is G and 0 otherwise) and yijkt;E (1 if there is E and 0 otherwise). If the MNE chooses A,
then (yijkt;A = 1, yijkt;G = 0, yijkt;E = 0), if the MNE chooses G, then (yijkt;A = 0, yijkt;G = 1,
yijkt;E = 0) or if the MNE chooses E, then (yijkt;A = 0, yijkt;G = 0, yijkt;E = 1).
"ijkt;s denotes error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and
variance-covariance matrix V , where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations
 as o¤-diagonal elements. The model has a structure similar to that of a seemingly unrelated
regression model, except that the dependent variables are binary indicators.
The independence of residuals is tested by using an LR test to explore the existence of nesting
possibilities if any.
12The computationally cumbersome multivariate probit model module written by Capellari and Jenkins (2003)
in STATA does not involve marginal e¤ects computations. Capellari and Jenkins (2003) present a comparison
of bivariate probit (maximum likelihood estimation) to their multivariate probit (simulated maximum likelihood
estimation) analysis and come to a conclusion that as long as the number of random draws and the sample size are
large enough the two methods yield very similar predictions. Since these two conditions are satised in the estimations
in this paper, I use bivariate probit estimation to give a avor of the economic size of the estimates.
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4.2 The dependent variable
In this section, I discuss the denition of entry modes used in the empirical setting and provide
detailed information on the dependent variable. The dataset is composed of observations on the
cross-border activities of Swedish MNEs in 42 countries during three distinct time periods: 1987-90,
1991-94 and 1995-98. The choice of countries is determined by the availability of the trade cost
measure and control variables (described in the next section). The rm-level data used in this
study have been collected from a questionnaire sent to Swedish MNEs by the Research Institute
of Industrial Economics (RIIE) in Stockholm, Sweden about every fourth year since 1970s. The
data include all Swedish MNEs in manufacturing industry and contain detailed information such
as employment, production, R&D and entry modes on each majority owned foreign manufacturing
a¢ liate. I use only the most recent years since the survey questions have changed dramatically
over time.
The data do not include exporter-only rms or purely domestic Swedish rms. However, the
model presented in Section 3 is applicable investigating how an already existing multinational
rm expands in a new host country (or in an expanding host country). There is a great deal of
variation in the degree of multinationality in the data. More than half of the rms are single a¢ liate
multinationals. An overwhelming majority of rms have foreign operations in just a few countries.
When a new opportunity to serve a host country arises, this chance may come to a multinational
active in another market. Therefore, the data might still capture the model quite well.
For the present analysis I adopt the denitions of cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI as in
the RIIE survey. More particularly, RIIE asks the following four questions to each foreign a¢ liate:
(1) From what year has the a¢ liate been a production company of the group? (2) Was the a¢ liate
a sales company of the group before the year mentioned above? (3) Did the a¢ liate operate as
a production company of another group before the year mentioned above? (4) Was the a¢ liate a
state-owned company before the year mentioned above? If the answers to last three questions are
all negative, then the investment is classied as a greeneld FDI. If the answer to question 3 is
a¢ rmative, then it is a cross-border M&A.13
The theory presented in Section 3 and the IO view refer explicitly to the so-called horizontal
FDI: FDI made in order to produce a nal good for sales in the host country. There are other
types of FDI which are ignored in these models such as production in the host country to export
13The frequency of a¢ liates born from sales companies of the group and the state-owned enterprise acquisitions is
low.
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Figure 2: Sale composition of Swedish MNEs: All newly established affiliates, 1987-
1998
back to the parent country or elsewhere. These can be called vertical and export platform FDI,
respectively. In this paper, I take this di¤erence into account.
Hizjen et al. (2008) also make a distinction between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
Nevertheless, they do not consider greeneld FDI. They dene horizontal M&As as mergers between
rms within the same industry, whereas non-horizontal M&As as mergers between rms in di¤erent
industries. This is a reasonable way of di¤erentiating; yet, given that the Swedish data have more
detail than industry classications, I use the composition of a¢ liate sales to single out horizontal
investments.
Figure 2 shows the sales composition of Swedish MNEs for all newly established foreign a¢ liates
between 1987 and 1998. On average, 71% of the a¢ liate production is for local sales, 21% for exports
to third countries and 8% for exports back to Sweden. The majority of investments seem to be
horizontal. In Figure 2 vertical FDI is negligible but there is a noteworthy level of export platform
FDI. When the local country is used as an export platform, it is not clear whether the MNE hurts
the local incumbents by entering. If that is the case, in other words, if the local incumbent is
also an exporter to the same third country, then falling trade costs are expected to reduce the
acquisition price as in the horizontal FDI scenario. Otherwise, the e¤ect of the host country tari¤
on the export platform FDI is not that clear-cut. Taking all this and the IO theories discussed in
Section 2 and 3 into consideration, I only include newly established a¢ liates for which the share of
production for the local market is more than 75% of their total production.14
14Results using the entire sample, which are excluded for brevity and available upon request, are very similar to
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Table 1: Entry characteristics of Swedish MNEs by regions
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
A G A G A G A G
Western Europe 107 21 63 16 42 7 212 44
Major Non-European OECD 18 5 9 3 10 2 37 10
Eastern Europe and Russia 0 0 8 8 2 5 10 13
South and Central America 3 0 2 1 6 2 11 3
Asia / Africa 0 0 2 3 8 6 10 9
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 All periods
Cross-border M&A 128 84 68 280
Greeneld FDI 26 31 22 79
Exporting 1120 1358 902 3380
Now I turn to entry mode patterns of Swedish MNEs. Table 1 summarizes the number of foreign
entry transactions by Swedish MNEs between 1987 and 1998. I distinguish between cross-border
M&As and greeneld FDI as well as the location of these investments in broad regional categories.
When scrutinizing this table, several remarks can be made. First, as can be observed in the bottom
half of Table 1, in each time period foreign entry is small when compared to exporting, which is
true for an overwhelming majority of MNEs around the globe. However, among the two entry
modes the total number of M&As is substantially higher than that of greeneld FDI in all three
time periods. M&As are almost 4.9 times as greeneld FDI in 1987-1990, 2.7 times in 1991-1994
and 3.1 times in 1995-1998.
This brings me to my second remark. There is a puzzling, steady decline both in the number
and the relative importance of M&As over the years. Diminishing number of rms surveyed or
survey response rates over the years are the rst two culprits one can think of, however, neither
have progressively declined. For example, the number of rms responded uctuates over the years
from 115 to 131 to 97. Ekholm and Hesselman (2000) who wrote the rst report about the 1998
survey also made the same comment. One plausible explanation is the possibility of some Swedish
MNEs cease to be multinationals and revert back to exporting due to lower trade costs. Then,
they would presumably be no longer in the sample. This would imply an underestimation of the
e¤ect of trade costs on M&A activity. Because the survey does not involve questions related to
exit, this point cannot be adequately addressed. If anything, this decline in the number of rms
the ones reported in this paper since horizontal investments dominate the sample. Moreover, since the likelihood
functions were never concave when running estimations with vertical and platform investments due to small sample
sizes, I was not able to get any sensible results for those types of investments.
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and foreign entry should bias results against the IO view. Another explanation is the possibility
that the number of targets is xed and as more FDI happens, the availability of targets declines,
driving up their price, reducing M&As relative to greeneld investment.
Third, observe the top half of Table 1. An overwhelming majority of investments are in Western
Europe followed by major non-European OECD countries. Both M&As and greeneld FDI in these
two regions are higher than all the other regions together. The common denominator of all these
countries is their level of development. As stated in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), FDI goes
predominantly to advanced countries, even though the share of developing countries has been rising.
Developed countries o¤er a large and growing demand coupled with ease of nding sub-contractors
and distribution channels all of which favor entry.
Fourth and last, developed countries supply a higher number of high quality acquisition targets.
Table 1 shows that Swedish MNEs have considerably higher M&As in Western Europe and major
non-European OECD countries. The preferred mode of entry in developing countries is not as clear,
however. The share of greeneld FDI in all entry modes (calculated by using the last two columns
of the top half of Table 1) in developing countries is 45%, whereas it is only 18% in developed
countries.
4.3 Measuring trade costs
In this study I consider two components of trade costs: trade barriers and transportation costs. The
latter is proxied by Distance measured using the great circle formula. This formula approximates
the shape of the earth as a sphere and calculates the minimum distance along the surface between
Sweden and a foreign country.15 As a measure of transportation costs I expect it to have a positive
impact on M&As and a negative impact on greeneld FDI. However, distance also proxies for the
possibilities of personal contact between managers and customers and cultural di¤erences across
countries. These tend to reduce transfers of information and the establishment of trust. Therefore,
distance may negatively a¤ect all types of FDI.
Trade barriers measure Tari¤ is constructed by using data from UNCTAD-TRAINS data put
together by Jon Haveman under the "Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog".16 It includes information on
15Results are similar with geographic centers formula and thus not reported for brevity. This may be due to the
fact that majority of Swedish a¢ liates are in Western Europe with small countries where this is likely not much of
an issue.
16 I am indebted to Jon Haveman for his work on trade barriers. See http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/index.shtm
for information on the UNCTAD TRAINS database and http://www.eiit.org/Resources.html for detailed information
on the Ultimate Trade Barrier Catalog.
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tari¤, nontari¤ barriers (NTBs) and trade data at the six-digit HS industry level for 103 countries.
I compute unweighted and weighted averages at the four-digit ISIC (Rev.3) industry level where
the largest share of the a¢ liate production takes place. Then, I map these gures into the two-digit
RIIE industry level by using concordances provided by the Statistics Sweden. I only report results
for the unweighted tari¤ means to maximize the number of observations in regressions.
I also compute NTBs as a measure of trade barriers for Swedish MNEs. However, the aggre-
gation of NTBs to two-digit RIIE industry level is very ad hoc since NTB is an indicator variable
(with an overwhelming majority of 1s as opposed to 0s) pointing out only the existence of a certain
type of trade restriction. There is no information on the extent of its use. As can be expected the
regressions using the NTBs at this aggregation level do not give any robust results and therefore I
do not report them here.
Figure 3: Kernel density of Tari¤ by entry modes
Figure 3 shows the kernel density diagram of Tari¤ . The solid line signies cross-border M&As
and the dashed line greeneld FDI. The density of M&As is much higher than greeneld FDI at
lower values of Tari¤ and gets dominated by greeneld FDI at higher values of Tari¤ . Notice
that M&As completely disappear for tari¤ rates greater than 22%. This observation provides some
suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that acquisitions are discouraged by rising tari¤s.
Table 2 lists all countries included in the sample, their average tari¤ rate, distance from Sweden,
the number of rms producing there in 1998, and the sum of all Swedish M&As and greeneld FDIs
in the sample period. Table 2 does not reveal much about the relationship between trade costs and
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Table 2: The sample of countries, 1987-1998
Average Distance No. of
Tari¤ 1000 rms No. of No. of
Country % km 1998 A G
Germany
UK
USA
Denmark
Poland
France
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
5.8
5.8
4.3
5.8
10.5
5.8
5.7
5.8
5.8
5.8
1.119
1.436
6.336
0.523
0.810
1.546
0.400
1.128
2.595
1.653
28
26
26
25
21
20
18
16
15
15
41
28
29
29
4
16
16
12
9
20
11
4
6
3
10
6
7
0
1
3
Norway
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Austria
China
India
Mexico
Australia
Hungary
Russia
5.5
5.8
17.5
8.5
8.6
34.2
29.5
15.2
9.1
9.7
11.4
0.417
1.285
10.904
6.345
1.244
7.788
6.765
9.603
15.588
1.319
1.227
14
14
12
8
8
8
7
6
4
4
4
16
8
6
4
8
2
3
5
3
4
2
3
1
2
3
3
5
1
1
0
1
2
Malaysia
Japan
Czech Republic
Greece
Portugal
Korea
South Africa
Philippines
Ireland
Argentina
13.9
16.1
8.2
5.8
5.8
8.5
9.5
20.5
5.8
12.9
9.354
8.193
1.054
2.409
2.992
7.453
9.524
9.341
1.633
12.541
4
4
4
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
1
0
1
5
2
1
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
Thailand
Turkey
Colombia
Taiwan
Indonesia
Slovenia
New Zealand
Chile
Venezuela
Iceland
Israel
23.3
8.9
13.2
9.9
12.3
5.7
6.7
10.9
13.5
4.2
10.1
8.276
2.175
9.691
8.346
10.521
1.494
17.002
13.067
8.724
2.142
1.227
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
form of FDI. The bottom of table shows many countries with very high tari¤ rates and low levels of
Swedish entry. The top part shows low tari¤ rates coupled with high degrees of M&As. However,
this may simply reect that Swedish multinationals mainly invest in developed European countries
which also have lower tari¤ rates and a low degree of remoteness than the average country.
Last, I examine the sectoral composition of entry modes. In the dataset, Swedish manufacturing
MNEs operate in 33 industries. These industries (under 15 broad categories, mostly consistent with
ISIC, Rev.3) are reported in the Appendix. Table 3 presents the number of cross-border M&As and
greeneld FDI along with the average tari¤ levels by these broad industry categories. Fabricated
metal products, chemicals, paper products and electrical machinery are the sectors with highest
foreign entry. These sectors reect the comparative advantage of Sweden. Beyond that, however,
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Table 3: Entry modes and average tariffs by industry, 1987-1998
Cross-border Greeneld Average
Industry M&As FDI Tari¤ (%)
Food and beverages 15 6 12.1
Textile, apparel and leather 2 3 15.2
Furniture 4 1 13.9
Wood and wood products 10 2 7.4
Paper and paper products 38 6 9.7
Chemicals, plastic, and petroleum 34 16 10.9
Non-metallic mineral products 14 3 9.0
Basic metal 2 1 3.5
Fabricated metal products 67 9 11.0
O¢ ce machines and computers 16 4 7.9
Non-electrical machinery and equipment 22 1 9.0
Electrical machinery, appliances and supplies 34 12 9.8
Professional, scientic, optical products 1 1 8.0
Transport equipment 15 10 7.8
Other manufacturing 6 3
observe that average tari¤ in these industries are not the highest, which warrants some further
exploration.
4.4 Firm characteristics
The model provided in Section 3 is a highly stylized one and its raison dêtre is to provide a
framework for the empirical analysis. The controls used in the regressions hereafter are inspired
both from this simple model and the broader FDI literature.
Firm-specic assets. As Markusen (2002) points out, multinationals arise from the use of
knowledge capital, a broad term that includes human capital of employees, patents, blueprints and
procedures, which are called rm specic assets.
Multinationals can reduce their production costs through extensive use of these assets some of
which can be provided to additional plants without reducing their value in existing plants. I use
R&D intensity as a proxy. R&D Intensity is the MNEs total R&D expenditures divided by total
sales at the end of each time period.17 High-tech rms are more dependent on their own technology
creation and production technology, and as a result are more likely to enter by greeneld FDI. Thus,
I expect R&D to a¤ect greeneld FDI positively -pointed out by the theory in Section 3 as well.
Bargaining strength. Market share of the rm is the most widely used bargaining power measure
in the empirical IO literature. There is a lack of data with broad industry and country coverage for
the market share of a multinational in industry j in country k in time t. The next best alternative
17 I also used marketing intensity as a measure of rms specic assets for robustness. The results are similar and
available upon request.
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is using the market concentration in industry j in country k in time t. OECD STAN database
o¤ers concentration measures for a limited number of countries and sectors from 1980 to 2000. I
used these in my early regressions without much success due to many missing observations and
small sample sizes.
Starting back with Anderson and Gatignon (1986), in the international business and manage-
ment strategy literatures (See Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Davidson and McFetridge (1984,
1985) and Anand (2002)), international experience has been cited as an indicator of low levels
of internal uncertainty and greater condence in business dealings and thus stronger bargaining
positions around the negotiation table. Therefore, in this paper, I assume that multinationals with
more international experience are stronger bargainers. I use both dimensions of experience: previ-
ous experience in the host country measured by the number of the previous a¢ liates of the MNE
in the host country, A¤host and previous experience in the world markets measured by the number
of the previous a¢ liates of the MNE all around world, A¤world.
A¤host carries information about the local knowledge of the rm that is specic to the host
country, such as distribution networks, connections to local bureaucracy, and knowledge of lo-
cal business culture. Note that A¤host may also represent competitive e¤ects or the bargaining
strength. If the MNE already has a¢ liates in the host country, it may not want to hurt itself
by increasing the competition through a new venture and thus may incline more towards M&As
which eliminate rivals. There is a well-established international business literature drawing atten-
tion to the di¤erential impact of this variable on entry modes. Previous experience increases the
local knowledge and connections of the MNE and thus may foster greeneld FDI over cross-border
M&As. On the other hand, it may also promote M&As because experienced MNEs are able to
monitor their partners more e¤ectively. Therefore, the expected sign is positive for both entry
strategies yet the strength of this e¤ect on each entry mode is ambiguous.
A¤world represents a broad international experience that fosters FDI by MNEs (Caves, 2007).
The expected sign for this variable for both entry modes is positive. However, I expect a stronger
positive for cross-border M&As since international experience is anticipated to boost the bargaining
strength and thus the probability of M&As. I also use rm size measured by total employment
in the rm as an indicator of the bargaining strength (results not reported in the paper due to
brevity but available upon request), since larger rms with deep pockets are considered to be more
experienced and stronger bargainers (See Caves, 2007).
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4.5 Country characteristics
The country-level data are collected from the International Financial Statistics of IMF, the In-
ternational Country Risk Group, and the World Development Indicators Database of the World
Bank.
Market size (measured by GDP), infrastructure (measured by telephone mainlines per one
million people,Tel), skill level of the labor force in the host country (measured by the share of
university graduates in the population, Skill), trade openness (share of trade volume in GDP,
Open) are all well-known determinants of entry and are expected to favor both kinds of entry
(Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001)).
GDP per capita is used to account for the availability of acquisition targets in the host country
because it is a broad measure of general level of development. Even though it is easier to nd sub-
contractors and distribution channels in developed countries, which in fact favors entry, another
important issue is that a developed country supplies a bigger number of more high quality acquisi-
tion targets. It is harder to nd suitable acquisition targets in less developed countries. Therefore,
acquisitions are expected to be more favorable in countries with high GDP/capita.
Not only the tari¤ and transportation costs reductions but also other aspects of liberalization
that are potentially relevant for FDI and exports should be accounted for. For example, product
market regulations have been liberalized in many OECD countries, and, more generally, other
aspects related to the "cost of doing business" have fallen over time. If these are correlated with
tari¤s (which is likely) this would bias the results. Data from the World Bank "Doing Business"
database is unfortunately only available after 2004. To control for these aspects of liberalization
and also the xed costs greeneld FDI I use International Country Risk Group index ICRG to
measure the general investment climate, rule of law, and bureaucracy quality.
Summary statistics and a correlations table are provided in the Appendix.
5 Results
5.1 FDI versus exporting
I begin with the bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on both types of FDI by Swedish multi-
nationals, since it puts the results in perspective with respect to the existing literature with no
distinction between cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI. The rst two columns in Table 4 present
the coe¢ cient estimates whereas the last two columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory
21
Table 4: fdi versus exporting
Bivariate Probit
Estimates Marginal e¤ects
Entry mode FDI E FDI E
Tari¤
1.460*
(0.762)
-2.318***
(0.367)
0.103*
(0.053)
-0.415***
(0.145)
R&D Intensity
-0.243
(0.898)
-8.532***
(0.661)
-0.017
(0.063)
-0.667***
(0.261)
A¤host
0.085*
(0.049)
0.056
(0.036)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.022*
(0.012)
A¤world
0.016***
(0.0001)
0.005*
(0.028)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.002*
(0.001)
GDP
0.088***
(0.026)
-0.048***
(0.015)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.019***
(0.006)
GDP/capita
0.004
(0.008)
0.031***
(0.004)
0.0003
(0.0005)
0.012***
(0.002)
Open
-0.078
(0.147)
0.262***
(0.074)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.0103***
(0.029)
Tel
0.837*
(0.518)
1.246**
(0.052)
0.059*
(0.033)
0.492***
(0.125)
ICRG
0.101**
(0.042)
0.058**
(0.023)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.023**
(0.009)
Skill
0.143***
(0.046)
-0.136***
(0.024)
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.054***
(0.009)
Observations 5589
Wald 2 1271
Success prob. 0.03 0.44
 -0.942
LR test of 532.9
indep. of eq. (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a
constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects.
variables on the success probability of each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, coun-
try, and industry xed e¤ects. Wald 2 is 1271 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is
signicant revealing that FDI and E are not independent from each other as strategies.
Tari¤ is barely signicant and positive in equation FDI (column 1) and negative and signicant
in equation E (column 2), revealing that falling trade costs discourage FDI by Swedish multination-
als. This is in line with the tari¤-jumping argument in the previous literature where researchers
generally have found a signicant positive e¤ect of trade costs on multinational entry without
di¤erentiating between di¤erent entry modes using aggregate data.18
Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an innitesimal increase in Tari¤ increase the
probability of FDI by 10.3%. Although this is not large in absolute magnitude, compared to the
probability evaluated at the sample mean of 3% (given as success probability in the bottom of
18See Blonigen et al. (2003) for a recent review of this literature.
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Table 4), this is nevertheless economically meaningful. However, recall that the estimate is only
signicant at 10% level. This may be driven by the use of rm level data as opposed to the previous
studies. This may also point out a need to di¤erentiate between the FDI modes of entry, which is
done in the next section.
Turning to other coe¢ cient estimates in the rst two columns of Table 4, host country experience
(A¤host), international experience (A¤world), infrastructure (Tel) and investment climate in the
host country (ICRG) increase the likelihood of both strategies. All of these have relatively small
marginal e¤ects on the mode of entry except for Tel with a magnitude of 49.2%.
R&D Intensity of the multinational signicantly reduces the likelihood of E with a marginal
e¤ect of -66.7%. Experience in the host country (A¤host) measured as the number of previous
a¢ liates in the host country have no e¤ect on probability of exporting however, it increases the
likelihood of FDI. Broader international experience (A¤world) measured as the number of previous
a¢ liates in the world increases the likelihood of both FDI and exporting. The marginal e¤ects are
rather small.
5.2 Cross-border M&As versus greeneld FDI
Before estimating the full model, I turn to the bivariate probit estimates of tari¤ e¤ects on new
entry by Swedish multinationals through cross-border M&As and greeneld FDI, because the use
of bivariate probit model provides the benet of being able to calculate the marginal e¤ects for
each entry strategy. The rst two columns in Table 5 present the coe¢ cient estimates whereas the
last two columns include the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the success probability of
each strategy. All regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects. Wald
2 is 323 indicating a good t. Correlation coe¢ cient  is signicant revealing that A and G are
not independent from each other as strategies.
Tari¤ is signicant and negative in equation A (column 1) and positive yet insignicant in
equation G (column 2), revealing that falling trade costs encourage cross-border M&As by Swedish
multinationals. This signicant and negative tari¤ e¤ect is a new result.
Among recent studies are Hijzen et al (2008) and Breinlich (2008) who investigate cross-border
M&As in depth. Both concentrate on the number of M&As in an industry, whereas I use a single
rms choice of M&As or greeneld FDI as my starting point. The former nd that the impact of
bilateral trade costs is less negative or even positive the higher the share of horizontal mergers is
in total mergers. They interpret this as tari¤-jumping motivations playing some role in explaining
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Table 5: Cross-border MAs versus Greenfield FDI
Bivariate Probit
Estimates Marginal e¤ects
Entry mode A G A G
Tari¤
-2.25**
(0.955)
0.148
(1.19)
-0.115**
(0.047)
0.002
(0.019)
R&D Intensity
-1.99
(1.26)
5.58***
(1.13)
-0.102
(0.064)
0.089***
(0.020)
A¤host
0.103**
(0.044)
-0.159*
(0.094)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.003*
(0.002)
A¤world
0.019***
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.001***
(0.0001)
0.0002***
(0.00005)
GDP
0.079***
(0.029)
0.048
(0.044)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.0007
(0.0007)
GDP/capita
0.011
(0.009)
0.007
(0.014)
0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0002)
Open
-0.144
0.168
0.496*
(0.294)
-0.007
(0.008)
0.008*
(0.005)
Tel
1.24*
(0.749)
0.045
(1.11)
0.063*
(0.038)
-0.0007
(0.005)
ICRG
0.083*
(0.050)
0.148**
(0.075)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.002**
(0.001)
Skill
0.201***
(0.055)
0.114
(0.082)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.001)
Observations 5589
Wald 2 323
Success prob. 0.02 0.005
 -0.542
LR test of 7.02
indep. of eq. (0.008)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a
constant, time, country, and industry xed e¤ects.
horizontal mergers. The latter nds no robust evidence of the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions in the
cross-border M&A activity.
Bivariate probit results indicate that trade costs have an adverse e¤ect on the probability
of cross-border M&As and a positive but insignicant e¤ect on greeneld FDI. This might be
the case when the MNEs tari¤-jump with G but not A. Since this result is not signicant, this
interpretation might be a long shot, yet the result for A is strikingly di¤erent from the previous
literature providing some evidence for the IO view. Falling tari¤s make acquisition targets less
expensive and thus increase the likelihood of cross-border M&As.
Calculating the marginal e¤ects shows that an innitesimal increase in Tari¤ reduces the prob-
ability of a cross-border M&A by 11.5%. Again, although this seems small in absolute magnitude,
compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of 2% (given as success probability in
the bottom of Table 5), this is economically meaningful.
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Turning to other coe¢ cient estimates in the rst two columns of Table 5, host country experience
of the MNE (A¤host), international experience (A¤world), market size (GDP) and labor skill in
the host country (Skill) increase the likelihood of both kinds of entry. All of these have relatively
small marginal e¤ects on the mode of entry.
Firm-specic assets measured by R&D Intensity reduce the likelihood of A. As expected, R&D
Intensity increases the odds in favor of G with a marginal e¤ect of 8.9%. While the host country
infrastructure and the skill level of the labor force in the host country, respectively proxied by
Skill and Tel increase the odds in favor of M&As. Investment climate (ICRG) in the host country
increases the likelihood of both entry modes.
5.3 Exporting versus cross-border M&As versus greeneld FDI
Table 6 reports the multivariate probit estimates of e¤ects of trade costs on the probability of con-
ducting A, G or E. The rst three columns report the baseline specication without the interaction
terms as in Equation (6), whereas the last three columns present results with the interaction terms
as in Equation (7). Wald 2 for the rst specication is 1280 and for the second is 1295 indicating
a good t.
Also notice that the correlation coe¢ cient between A and G (AG) is almost insignicant,
whereas that between A and E (AE) and G and E (GE), are both signicantly di¤erent from
zero. This suggests a nested structure where rst the decision of foreign entry is made and then the
mode of entry is chosen. However, as stated earlier, the use of a nested logit models is impossible
due to the lack of choice specic attributes in the dataset.
In Table 6, in line with Hypothesis 1 and the main conjecture from the IO view, the variable of
interest, Tari¤ , decreases the likelihood of cross-border M&As. The odds of E also declines in Tari¤ ,
which suggests that cross-border M&As and exporting are complements rather than substitutes as
discussed in Neary (2007). It is worth recognizing that although it is not signicant, Tari¤ carries
the traditional theory predicted positive coe¢ cient in equation G in column 2.
The e¤ect of tari¤ barriers is negative for both cross-border M&As and exporting, supporting
Hypothesis 1 from the theory. Interestingly though, the adverse e¤ect of trade costs measured as
tari¤s is somewhat stronger for cross-border M&As. In other words, trade liberalization can induce
more cross-border M&As than exporting. This is a new result.
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, though some are insignicant. Through-
out almost all equations A¤world have signicant positive signs for both cross-border M&As and
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Table 6: Exporting versus cross-border MAs versus greenfield FDI (Tariffs)
Multivariate Probit
Baseline Interactions
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ -2.38***(0.918)
0.115
(1.18)
-2.23***
(0.347)
-2.62***
(0.991)
0.599
(1.35)
-2.90***
(0.381)
R&D Intensity -2.72**(1.18)
4.70***
(1.16)
8.75***
(0.647)
-2.73**
(1.18)
4.67***
(1.15)
8.70***
(0.646)
A¤host 0.097**(0.049)
-0.174**
(0.087)
0.060
(0.037)
0.168**
(0.092)
-0.130*
(0.059)
-0.048
(0.077)
A¤world 0.017***(0.002)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.166***
(0.003)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
Tari¤ x A¤host 1.42**(0.732)
0.573
(2.94)
2.37*
(1.21)
Tari¤ x A¤world 0.016**(0.008)
0.029*
(0.012)
0.087***
(0.024)
GDP 0.082***(0.029)
0.058
(0.045)
-0.053***
(0.015)
0.081***
(0.0.29)
0.054
(0.045)
-0.052***
(0.015)
GDP/capita 0.008(0.009)
0.003
(0.014)
-0.033***
(0.004)
0.008
(0.009)
0.005
(0.014)
-0.033***
(0.004)
Open 0.020(0.163)
-0.404
(0.295)
0.265***
(0.073)
0.009
(0.163)
-0.411
(0.299)
0.262***
(0.073)
Tel 1.11(0.704)
0.116
(1.08)
1.23***
(0.311)
1.24*
(0.710)
0.168
(1.09)
1.26***
(0.312)
ICRG 0.071(0.049)
0.131*
(0.074)
0.046**
(0.023)
0.064
(0.049)
0.123*
(0.076)
0.042*
(0.023)
Skill 0.152***(0.052)
0.101
(0.081)
-0.137***
(0.023)
0.152***
(0.052)
0.096
(0.081)
-0.135***
(0.023)
Time e¤ects
Country e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations 5589 5589
Wald 2 1280 1295
Correlation.
AG
0.136
(0.094)
0.147*
(0.084)
AE
-0.958***
(0.074)
-0.976***
(0.076)
GE
-0.453***
(0.073)
-0.459***
(0.033)
LR test of 386 389
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry
xed e¤ects.
greeneld FDI, pointing out that Swedish MNEs with bigger size and more international market
experience have a higher chance of entering new markets to serve those markets. In short, broad
international experience matters.
On the other hand, A¤host always favors cross-border M&As and reduces to odds against G,
which suggests that Swedish MNEs endowed with stronger connections to local bureaucracy or
knowledge of local business culture prefer cross-border M&As to greeneld FDI. This may also be
interpreted as Swedish MNEs with more bargaining power derived from their previous experience
in the host market acquire local rms rather than establishing wholly owned subsidiaries.
Swedish MNEs with high R&D Intensity favor greeneld FDI.GDP/capita (level of host country
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Table 7: Exporting versus cross-border MAs versus greenfield FDI (Distance)
Multivariate Probit
Baseline Interactions
Entry mode A G E A G E
Distance -0.125***(0.017)
-0.101***
(0.025)
-0.068***
(0.005)
-0.189***
(0.024)
-0.105***
(0.026)
-0.073***
(0.006)
R&D Intensity -1.55(0.997)
3.53***
(0.921)
6.77***
(0.442)
-1.56
(0.993)
3.52***
(0.923)
6.73***
(0.441)
A¤host 0.057*(0.032)
-0.141**
(0.072)
-0.087***
(0.024)
0.092*
(0.049)
-0.208*
(0.122)
-0.132***
(0.037)
A¤world 0.016***(0.001)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.002)
Distance x A¤host 0.006**(0.004)
0.018
(0.024)
0.019
(0.024)
Distance x A¤world 0.002***(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0006)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
GDP 0.093***(0.027)
0.062
(0.043)
-0.032**
(0.013)
0.127***
(0.029)
0.060
(0.043)
-0.035**
(0.013)
GDP/capita 0.005(0.008)
0.006
(0.013)
-0.023***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.008)
0.006
(0.043)
0.023***
(0.004)
Open 0.595***(0.165)
-0.859***
(0.274)
0.502***
(0.067)
0.575***
(0.165)
-0.869***
(0.275)
-0.503***
(0.067)
Tel 1.73**(0.716)
2.43**
(1.15)
0.067
(0.294)
1.76**
(0.731)
2.47**
(1.15)
0.067
(0.294)
ICRG 0.133***(0.041)
0.171***
(0.057)
0.092***
(0.018)
0.112***
(0.041)
0.170***
(0.057)
0.090***
(0.018)
Skill 0.093*(0.053)
0.076
(0.085)
-0.056**
(0.022)
0.107**
(0.055)
0.077
(0.085)
-0.055**
(0.022)
Time e¤ects
Country e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Observations 7805 7805
Wald 2 1933 1934
Correlation.
AG
0.146
(0.096)
0.149*
(0.072)
AE
-0.909***
(0.062)
-0.945***
(0.066)
GE
-0.450***
(0.067)
-0.462***
(0.068)
LR test of 437 450
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry
xed e¤ects. Country e¤ects are not used since Distance is time invariant.
development) signicantly reduces the likelihood exporting. A better business climate in the host
country ICRG improves the odds in favor of G and E. A skilled labor force in the host country
(Skill) increases the likelihood of A and reduces the odds for E.
Then, in the last three columns of Table 6, I examine whether trade cost e¤ects vary across
di¤erent types of rms to test Hypothesis 2 of the theory. To this e¤ect I add the interaction of trade
costs with bargaining strength to the previous specication. I use experience in the host country
and around the world as proxies for bargaining strength. As expected, the negative impact of trade
costs on cross-border M&As declines in bargaining strength. The linear trade cost term (Tari¤ )
is negative and signicant and the interaction terms are signicantly positive using both A¤host
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Table 8: Robustness, Different Subsamples
Multivariate Probit
OECD Firms Present in Whole Sample
Entry mode A G E A G E
Tari¤ -2.94***(1.12)
0.980
(1.76)
-4.65***
(0.542)
-3.65***
(0.896)
1.219*
(0.721)
-2.15***
(0.584)
R&D Intensity -2.46**(1.18)
3.85***
(1.34)
7.57***
(0.724)
-2.18**
(0.95)
4.21***
(1.87)
7.65***
(0.857)
A¤host 0.236**(0.098)
-0.131*
(0.077)
0.085
(0.089)
0.268***
(0.102)
-0.138**
(0.069)
-0.047
(0.062)
A¤world 0.008***(0.003)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.125***
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.004)
0.008***
(0.003)
Tari¤ x A¤host 2.79**(1.02)
0.122
(4.48)
2.68*
(0.08)
2.07***
(0.253)
0.932
(1.18)
1.12
(1.21)
Tari¤ x A¤world 0.195**(0.079)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.157**
(0.072)
0.389**
(0.029)
0.062***
(0.016)
0.112***
(0.024)
GDP 0.083***(0.029)
0.020
(0.046)
-0.061***
(0.015)
0.081***
(0.027)
0.054
(0.047)
-0.056***
(0.017)
GDP/capita 0.005(0.009)
0.016
(0.015)
-0.035***
(0.005)
0.008
(0.009)
0.016
(0.014)
-0.023***
(0.002)
Open 0.047(0.174)
-0.427
(0.322)
0.252***
(0.081)
0.009
(0.157)
-0.358
(0.302)
0.269***
(0.053)
Tel 1.10(0.811)
0.062
(1.42)
1.22***
(0.403)
1.35*
(0.801)
0.102
(1.24)
1.28***
(0.208)
ICRG 0.074(0.053)
0.144*
(0.096)
0.047*
(0.028)
0.074
(0.053)
0.143*
(0.072)
0.045*
(0.028)
Skill 0.164***(0.053)
0.017
(0.083)
-0.103***
(0.025)
0.162***
(0.051)
0.046
(0.081)
-0.152***
(0.043)
Time e¤ects
Country e¤ects
Industry e¤ects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations 4605 2002
Wald 2 785 565
Correlation.
AG
0.151*
(0.087)
0.117*
(0.057)
AE
-1.003***
(0.084)
-0.926***
(0.065)
GE
-0.457***
(0.079)
-0.459***
(0.039)
LR test of 376 318
indep. of eq. (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level,respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, and industry
xed e¤ects.
and A¤world as indicators of bargaining strength. This result implies that large and experienced
rms may not be as severely a¤ected by trade costs as small rms. Falling trade costs encourage
cross-border M&As conducted by small rms with less bargaining power more compared to large
and experienced rms with stronger bargaining positions.
As trade costs change Swedish MNEs with a single foreign a¢ liate are more likely to be severely
a¤ected. Multi-a¢ liate MNEs have better and wider distribution networks around the globe and
most importantly more international experience. Therefore, the M&As conducted by these rms
might be less prone to changes in trade costs. In short, both knowing the local conditions and the
degree of multinationality matter for how profound the e¤ect of trade costs will be on the mode of
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entry.
Table 7 reports the same specications using Distance as the measure of trade costs. From the
table it is observed that all foreign expansion strategies decline in trade costs. It is probably because
distance is not only a measure of transportation costs but also a measure of degree of information
transfers, establishment of trust and cultural di¤erence across countries. Sign and signicance of
the other variables are similar to the ones in Table 6.
Next, I turn my attention to investments in OECD countries as Swedish MNEs mainly invest in
developed countries which also have lower tari¤ rates than average country. Swedish MNEs invest
in nearby developed countries because they have lots of potential M&A targets, and these countries
just happen to have low trade costs cross-sectionally. Even though there are country-level regressors
to control for level of development of a country and country xed e¤ects in previous estimations,
a more compelling experiment is to restrict the sample to these nearby countries only to avoid
potentially spurious results. The rst three columns of Table 8 reports these results. Notice that
results are robust.
As a nal robustness exercise, I restrict the sample to the subset of rms that are present in the
whole sample. This would deal with two issues those who drop out to become purely exporters
and those who join the sample during it. Although this exercise limits a lot of the time series
variation in the sample, conclusions are similar or even stronger.
6 Conclusion
This paper is an endeavour to nd an answer to the apparent conict between the standard FDI
theory and recent trends. Standard theory predicts less foreign expansion the lower the trade costs.
However, 1990s were an era of rapid trade liberalization and intensely growing FDI. Standard theory
does not di¤erentiate between entry modes whereas newly emerging IO inspired theories underline
asymmetries and heterogeneity inherent in FDI. One such asymmetry is the di¤erential impact of
trade costs on modes of foreign expansion, the central thrust of the current paper.
In this paper, I attempt to disentangle the tari¤ e¤ects on entry mode decision by carrying out
an empirical analysis with rich, rm-level data on the activities of Swedish MNEs around the globe
in manufacturing sectors from 1987 to 1998. Two hypotheses emerge from a simple theoretical
framework. Cross-border M&As and exporting are encouraged by falling trade costs and a higher
bargaining power measured by host country and global experience dampens the impact of trade
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costs on entry modes.
The panorama of the results presented in the previous section shows the following: (i) There
is almost no evidence of tari¤-jumping foreign entry when di¤erent entry modes are not ignored.
(ii). Trade liberalization increases the likelihood of cross-border M&As as conjectured by recent
studies. (iii). Cross-border M&As and exporting respond in the same way to changing tari¤s yet
interestingly M&As are even more severely a¤ected by changes in trade costs than exports. (iv)
International experience dampens the e¤ect of trade costs on the mode of entry.
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Appendix
Table A1: List of industries
RIIE
Code Industry
Manufacture of food and beverage
1.1
1.2
Food manufactures
Beverage manufactures
Textile, apparel, and leather
2.1
2.2
2.3
Textiles
Apparel
Leather and footware
11.3 Furniture
11.2 Wood and wood products (excluding furniture)
Manufacture of paper and paper products
3.1
3.2
4.0
Pulp and paper
Paperboard and ne paper
Paper products
Manufacture of chemicals, plastic products, and petroleum
5.4
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.5
5.6
Petroleum reneries and manufacture products of petroleum and coal
Basic chemicals
Colors, glue, matches and cleansers
Drugs and medicines, pharmaceutical chemicals and botanical products
Rubber products
Plastic products
11.4 Non-metallic mineral products (except products of petroleum and coal)
Basic metal industries
6.1
6.2
Iron and steel basic industries
Non-ferrous metal basic industries
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
7.1
7.2
7.3
Tools
Metal constructions
Other fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment)
8.1 O¢ ce machines and computers
Manufacture of non-electrical machinery and equipment
8.2
8.3
Machinery for agriculture and forestry, machine tools and other special machinery
Other non-electrical machinery, weapons, and ammunition
Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliences, and supplies
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
Motors, generators, and transformers
Telecommunication equipment, radio, and TV
Electrical household appliances and supplies
Other electrical machinery and equipment
11.1 Professional, scientic, measuring and controlling equipment, optical products
Manufacture of transport equipment
10.1
10.2
Motor vehicles
Other transport equipment
15.0 Other manufacturing
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